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CONSTRUCTIVISM, EMBEDDED LIBERALISM 
AND ANTI-DUMPING – CANADIAN PUBLIC 
INTEREST INQUIRY AS CASE STUDY OF 
EMBEDDED LIBERALISM 
Wissam Aoun† 
ABSTRACT: The majority of proposals for international anti-dumping reform focus almost 
entirely on the relevant economic factors – consumer welfare losses and gains. Therefore, 
almost all proposals come to the exact same conclusion; in light of the enormous welfare 
losses suffered by domestic consumers, international anti-dumping law should be repealed in 
its entirety, or at least replaced by some form of international competition law. However, this 
analysis views the issue of anti-dumping law through the constructivist lens, and more 
specifically, the embedded liberalism view of international trade law. From this perspective, 
economics alone does not grasp the constitutive realities at play in anti-dumping law; domestic 
perspectives of legitimacy and fairness shape the contours of international anti-dumping law 
and these constitutive norms espouse a view that protectionism, in a variety of different shapes 
and forms, is as much a part of international trade law as the traditional laissez-faire liberalist 
approach. This article concludes that public interest inquiries, which form part of a small 
number of countries’ anti-dumping laws, embrace the constitutive realities at play in anti-
dumping law and provide an opportunity for development of legitimate international anti-
dumping reform. This article examines the Canadian approach to public interest inquiry in 
anti-dumping, including recent developments. This article concludes that the current Canadian 
experience demonstrates that embracing a public interest inquiry as part of anti-dumping 
reform may provide true hope for future development based on an embedded liberalism view 
of international trade relations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Economics of Anti-dumping 
The issue of anti-dumping has become one of the most prevalent research 
topics for international economics and legal scholars today. This should not be 
surprising given the ubiquitous nature that this trade remedy has developed. 
Many articles and research papers detail the growing concerns over the pervasive 
use of anti-dumping across the globe, by developed and developing countries 
alike. 1  The majority of criticisms are directed towards the poor economic 
foundation of anti-dumping; while often times referred to as a form of 
‘international competition law’, anti-dumping bears little legal or economic 
resemblance to domestic competition policies. 2  Competition law focuses on 
‘predatory pricing’, the selling of goods below cost by a firm attempting to 
monopolize a market. However, selling below cost is a common occurrence in 
market economies, and cannot be considered predatory without the requisite 
intent to unduly lessen competition. Indeed, economists have paid scant attention 
to predatory pricing given the numerous other more effective and efficient 
methods of monopolizing markets.3 
However, anti-dumping treats all goods imported at a price lower than the 
common selling price in the exporting country as being ‘dumped’, 4  and if 
‘injury’5 to the importing market is proven, the margin between the two prices is 
                                                 
 1 See for example Thomas J. Prusa, Anti-dumping: A Growing Problem in International 
Trade, 28 THE WORLD ECON. 683 (2005) [hereinafter Prusa]. 
 2 For an excellent discussion of the comparative economics of anti-dumping and 
Canadian competition law, see William A. Kerr, Dumping: Trade Policy in Need of a 
Theoretical Make Over, 54 CAN. J. AGRIC. ECON. 2006 at 11–31 [hereinafter Kerr]. 
 3 Id. at 16-17, 24. 
 4 Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement), 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter ADA]. 
 5 Id. 
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accommodated for by an imposed dumping duty. 6  In many instances, it is 
consumers and down-stream users who bear the burden of welfare losses by 
paying higher prices for the goods in question. This also creates dead weight 
costs to consumers who are required to subsidize the procedural mechanisms to 
prevent anti-dumping while accumulating no welfare benefits in instances where 
no anti-competitive behaviour is present.7 At least one study estimates that the 
net losses in consumer welfare caused by the imposition of anti-dumping duties 
in the United States and the E.U. may be as high as two to four billion dollars 
USD annually.8 
The economic statistics regarding the international proliferation of anti-
dumping paint a harrowing picture; what was once a meagre tool for a handful of 
‘traditional users’ 9  has become a widespread phenomenon embraced by 
developed and developing countries alike. However, as Prusa indicates, “the 
sharp increase in new users may understate how concentrated the use of [anti-
dumping] was until recently.” 10  Not only has anti-dumping use become 
dominated by the ‘new users’, the proliferation of the worldwide use of anti-
dumping actions has been driven almost entirely by ‘new users’.11 Traditional 
users may now account for less than half of global anti-dumping activity.12 New 
users file anti-dumping cases approximately 15-20 times more frequently than 
traditional users,13 and countries such as India and Argentina display a filing 
intensity in excess of 1000 times that of traditional users.14 Undoubtedly, global 
anti-dumping activity is skewed between developed and developing countries, 
                                                 
 6 Id. 
 7 Valerie Stevens, The Political Economy of Anti-Dumping in Canada: Section 45 of the 
Special Import Measures Act, 64 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1, 12-15 (2006) [hereinafter 
Stevens]. 
 8 Gunnar Niels & Adriaan ten Kate, Antidumping Policy in Developing Countries: Safety 
Valve or Obstacle to Free Trade?, 22 EUR J. POL. ECON. 618, (2006) [hereinafter Niels & ten 
Kate]. 
 9 The ‘traditional users’ are Canada, the United States, the E.U., and Australia; according 
to Prusa, supra note 1, at 688, until 1987, traditional users accounted for almost all 
international antidumping activity, and in the period from 1980-1984, over ninety-seven 
percent of all GATT disputes were filed by the traditional users. 
 10 Prusa, supra note 1, at 688. 
 11 Id. at 689. Prusa states that “without the proliferation of antidumping [(“AD”)] to 
dozens of new countries, AD activity would have been fairly constant over the last 25 years.” 
See also Mark Wu, Antidumping in Asia’s Emerging Giants, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 17-18, 22 
(Winter 2012) [hereinafter Wu], detailing the staggering statistics regarding increase 
antidumping activity by ‘new users’ compared to the traditional users. 
 12 Prusa, supra note 1, at 688. 
 13 Id. at 684, measured in comparison per U.S. dollar of imports. 
 14 Id. at 691, filing intensity is determined by calculating the number of cases per real 
dollar of imports and normalizing the ‘intensity’ measure so that the intensity level of the 
world’s most frequent AD user in 1980, the United States, is set to 100; therefore, filing 
intensity gives both an indication of comparison between other countries’ anti-dumping 
activity and that of the United States, as well as growth of anti-dumping activity since 1980. In 
addition to filing intensity, Prusa indicates that India and Argentina are filing ten to twenty 
times the frequency of the United States and the E.U. 
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with poorer countries such as India, China, Argentina, and Mexico dominating 
anti-dumping use.15 
Behind the simple statistics regarding use and proliferation rests a plethora 
of political and macroeconomic factors intertwined in the global anti-dumping 
activity. At least one study indicates that in Mexico, the number of anti-dumping 
complaints and the likelihood of an injury determination increase in proportion 
with the appreciation of real exchange rates, widening of current account deficits, 
or domestic manufacturing output slow down.16 Aggarwal states that for both 
developed and developing countries, a variety of macroeconomic factors lead to 
increases in anti-dumping activities. Pressures caused by adverse trade balance 
increase the number of anti-dumping initiations in low and lower middle income 
countries.17 Furthermore, 1% decline in tariff rates lead to an 8% increase in anti-
dumping initiations in developing countries.18 Finally, in all Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation Development countries, a 1% decline in industrial 
growth rate results in a 6-7% increase in number of anti-dumping initiations.19 
Furthermore, there is substantial statistical evidence that ‘retaliation’ plays a 
considerable role in anti-dumping activity.20 Research indicates that every one 
percent point increase in anti-dumping cases reported against low and lower 
middle-income results in a fourteen to sixteen percent increase in anti-dumping 
initiations.21 While at least one study seems to indicate that there is no ‘North-
South’ divide in retaliation measures,22 motivations for retaliation may differ 
between the two groups. While traditional users are more likely to file against 
new users in order to protect themselves from deflected trade,23 new users are 
more likely to file against traditional users in order to protect themselves from 
trade surges resulting from increased anti-dumping activity.24 
                                                 
 15 Id. at 693; see also Niels & ten Kate, supra note 8, at 628. 
 16 Supra note 8, at 623. 
 17 Aradhna Aggarwal, Macro Economic Determinants of Antidumping: A Comparative 
Analysis of Developed and Developing Countries, 32 WORLD DEV. 1043 (2004); note, 
Aggarwal uses the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) 
criteria for country income classification. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id.; see also Michael M. Knetter & Thomas J. Prusa, Macroeconomic Factors and 
Antidumping Filings: evidence from four countries, 61 J.  INT’L ECON 1 (2003). 
 20 See id. at 1048 for an excellent summary of research regarding the role that retaliation 
plays in global anti-dumping activity. 
 21 Id. at 1052. 
 22 Niels & ten Kate, supra note 8, at 621; what this indicates is that developing countries 
are not more or less likely to target developed countries, and vice versa. 
 23 Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Reynolds, The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the 
Role of Retaliation in Filings, 72 S. ECON. J. 877, 886-887 (2006); deflected trade occurs when 
there has been significant anti-dumping activity in a particular industry elsewhere in the world, 
resulting in increased trade in third world countries. 
 24 Id. at 887; see also Wu, supra note 11, at 37-40, wherein Wu elaborates on the 
politicized nature of the Indian anti-dumping regime and its effect on how and when 
antidumping cases are initiated. 
4
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 41 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol41/iss1/2
22 CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41, 2017] 
 
B. Specific Issues Surrounding International/Domestic Anti-dumping Law 
Prusa enumerates the problematic factors involved in the application of anti-
dumping law.25In addition to the ‘bad economics’ of anti-dumping, he addresses 
certain contentious procedural factors as well. Primarily, the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) Anti-Dumping Agreement (“ADA”) leaves tremendous 
discretion to domestic authorities in implementing anti-dumping laws.26 This has 
led to international inconsistencies in the methods used to determine dumping, 
domestic injury, and the imposition of duties. 27  This discretion appears 
particularly egregious when viewed in light of the seemingly unreasonable 
dumping duties imposed by countries with lax and non-transparent 
administrative authorities. 28  Furthermore, anti-dumping is the best option for 
industries seeking protection from foreign competition. Unlike the safeguard 
methods allowed under WTO law, anti-dumping petitions can be filed by a single 
interested party rather than the country as a whole, and duties are imposed 
against a single exporting country rather than the erga omnes application of 
safeguards.29 Moreover, while safeguards require the implementing country to 
offer concessions to affected states, anti-dumping imposes no such obligation.30 
C. The Language of ‘Unfairness’ 
Perhaps the central tenet of anti-dumping, which lays the foundation for its 
perceived legitimacy despite the plethora of criticisms, is what Finger and Zlate 
refer to as “the inflammatory rhetoric of foreign unfairness”.31 The Doha Round 
reform proposals to the previously enumerated procedural infirmities of anti-
dumping laws are what Finger and Zlate label as “thinking within the box.”32 
Rule shuffling, which favours one country or another while still allowing the 
foundation of the problem to remain intact, effectively stifles any possibility of 
qualitative or quantitative progress towards reducing the spread of anti-dumping 
usage.33 
Claims of (un)fairness in international trade may provide the only legitimacy 
for maintaining international anti-dumping laws. Ironically, in contemporary 
international law, legitimacy is typically used as justification for acting outside 
of the law, a ‘teleological suspension of the ethical,’34 in circumstances such as 
humanitarian intervention. However, the perception of illegitimate or ‘unfair’ 
trade practices is used to warrant the imposition of anti-dumping laws and duties 
                                                 
 25 Prusa, supra note 1. 
 26 Id. at 697. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 697, Niels & ten Kate, supra note 8, at 621-622. 
 29 Prusa, supra note 1, at 697. 
 30 Id. 
 31 J. Michael Finger & Andrei Zlate, Antidumping: Prospects for Discipline From the 
Doha Negotiations, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 531 (2005), at 543 [hereinafter Finger & Zlate]. 
 32 Id. at 545. 
 33 Id. 
 34 SOREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING (1932). 
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in instances where it appears there is no economic justification for such 
regulation. 
Thus, an analysis of the anti-dumping phenomenon must move beyond pure 
economics and give greater consideration to the socio-economics of political 
trends, norms, and constitutive realities. Indeed, many of the anti-dumping 
reforms proposed by economists highlight the poor economics of anti-dumping, 
and either ignore the realities behind claims of unfair trade or give them 
insufficient weight.35 While economists can afford themselves the comfort of 
remaining within the confines of economic models, legal scholars must view the 
reality of market transactions within the framework of political ideologies, 
legality, and legitimacy. 
II. CONSTRUCTIVISM AND EMBEDDED LIBERALISM 
A. Constructivism 
The analysis thus far has led to an apparent impasse, a deadlocked 
dichotomy between economic theory and the practical effects of the perception 
of (il)legitimacy. A second dichotomy, the division between international 
harmonization of trade rules and domestic regulation, presents a similar 
stalemate. The apparent conflict in anti-dumping is exacerbated by the fact that 
aspects of each of these two dichotomies project upon one another. The 
economics of anti-dumping and legitimacy are intertwined with the allocation of 
regulative functions between domestic and international institutions. 
International legal scholar Andrew T. F. Lang posits the existence of a tool 
for untangling the cascading dichotomies defined above. Lang proposes a re-
examination of the insightful work of renowned international academic, John 
Gerard Ruggie. Specifically, Lang believes that constructivism, 36  a theory 
enthusiastically put forward by Ruggie in the early 1980s, may act as a 
‘vanishing mediator’ in the deadlock between domestic and international 
institutional regulation, between domestic politics and international trade law, 
and a perspective lens through which critics may reconceptualise and redefine 
international law and economics.37 
Constructivist theory rests on a fundamental premise, a basic tenet that 
supports and animates all other assertions, a principle which Ruggie labelled an 
                                                 
 35 See for example Kerr, supra note 2; throughout this analysis, the tone is one of 
contempt for non-economic issues such as ‘fairness’, as if such factors are irrelevant to 
considerations of consumer welfare or ‘harm’; see also Finger & Zlate, supra note 31; here, 
although Finger and Zlate do provide many interesting and useful suggestions, they seem to 
rule out any possibility of ‘piecemeal’ reform, labelling any such reforms as ‘thinking within 
the box’, and as such, leading to no quantitative or qualitative change. 
 36 Andrew T. F. Lang, Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and 
Constructivist Approaches to the Study of the International Trade Regime, 9 J.  INTL ECON. L. 
81 (2006) [hereinafter Lang]. 
 37 Id. at 99, 105, 115-116. 
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‘inter-subjective framework of meaning.’ 38  This framework consists of 
‘constitutive rules’ 39  – sets of norms, beliefs, and intentions that define the 
contours of the regulative space, or as Lang puts it, “the rules of the game.”40 The 
concept of ‘inter-subjectivity’ relates to the ‘shared’ aspect of these beliefs – 
“regimes consist of shared expectations (beliefs) about how actors will and 
should behave in their [relations] with one another…expressing collective not 
individual intentionality.”41  Thus, ‘inter-subjectivity’ refers to the tapestry of 
norms and beliefs that form the underlying fabric of international relations. 
The most significant aspect of Ruggie’s ‘inter-subjective framework of 
meaning’ is the determination that this framework precedes any form of 
regulation, or, one may dare restate it as ‘legitimacy preceding legality’. Lang 
states that the framework consists of “a set of collectively agreed answers to 
questions about why the regime itself exists and what is its domain of operation, 
about the kinds of roles that member states are expected to play, the objectives 
they are expected to pursue, and so on.”42 Thus, Lang concisely summarizes by 
stating that “[c]onstitutive rules are logically prior to regulative rules, because 
they define the domain in which regulative rules take effect.”43 
In the domestic context, one could analogize the interplay between 
constructivism and legislation with the ‘incomplete contract theory’ of law and 
its view of rules and standards.44 While both rules and standards are difficult to 
define with precision, rules can be viewed as specific ‘laws’ that are defined with 
precision in order to efficiently regulate frequent behaviour. 45  However, if 
behaviour is relatively infrequent, efficiency concerns cannot justify the 
imposition of specific rules, and standards more aptly govern a range of 
conduct. 46  In a domestic common law system, as behaviour becomes more 
frequent, standards are defined with greater precision through the process of 
judicial interpretation and jurisprudence, and eventually, if need be, legislative 
intervention can turn a standard into a rule.47 As such, standards precede rules, 
and as standards develop over time, through activity, discussion and debate, 
standards may eventually develop into rules through governmental or 
institutional intervention. 
                                                 
 38 John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism and the Post-war Economic Order, 36 INTL ORG. 379, 380 (1982) [hereinafter 
Ruggie]. 
 39 Lang, supra note 36, at 104. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 103. 
 42 Id. at 104. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 333 
(1999). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Through this elaboration, the relative ambiguity between rules and standards can be 
seen; it is difficult to define precisely when a standard becomes a rule considering that all 
legislation at the domestic level is open to some interpretation. However, this framework does 
provide a useful tool for the analysis of the relative efficiencies/inefficiencies of an institution. 
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B. Embedded Liberalism 
Applying his constructivist approach to the international trade regime, 
Ruggie discerns an underlying constitutive norm present in international trade 
since the post-WWII era, which he refers to as ‘embedded liberalism.’48 Opposed 
to traditional liberalism, which emphasizes a laissez-faire approach to free 
market transactions and relations, Ruggie identifies a common thread in 
international trade since the inception of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (“GATT”) and the Bretton Woods institutions, what he describes as “a 
fusion of power and legitimate social purpose.”49 Ruggie concludes that ever-
changing perceptions of ‘legitimate social purpose’ have, in large part, shaped 
and determined the direction of the international economic order.50 
Lang’s analysis of ‘embedded liberalism’ focuses on this conception of 
‘legitimate social purpose’. Quoting Ruggie, Lang establishes the significance of 
‘embedded liberalism’ in the debate regarding international/domestic trade 
regulation, stating that “shared ideas at the international level…are in part a 
function of changes in ideas at the domestic level. Particularly important, as far 
as the international trade regime is concerned, are changes in ideas about the 
purposes ‘in pursuit of which state power was expected to be employed in the 
domestic economy.’”51 Tracing through the history of international trade, Ruggie 
determines that purely economic conceptions of ‘neo-protectionism’ may not 
necessarily run counter to the underlying intentions of the GATT/WTO. As 
reflected in the initial GATT texts and throughout post-WWII trade practice, all-
out liberalization has not been the fundamental premise of multilateralism, but 
rather, “multilateralism ultimately ‘meant non-discrimination above all.’”52 
Thus, Lang’s contention is that the embedded liberalism framework creates 
an imaginative space for international legal and economic scholars to “open our 
eyes to important and under-explored dimensions of our subject of study and 
provides a rigorous theoretical framework for their examination.”53 Lang surveys 
the work of a number of proponents of embedded liberalism and demonstrates 
how their work has assisted in reconceptualising and redefining such contentious 
notions in international trade as ‘free trade’, ‘protectionism’, and ‘trade 
intervention’ in light of the “ideational determinants” surrounding legitimate 
social purposes.54 Most importantly, Lang concludes that embedded liberalism 
reshapes our perceptions of the intentions of an international trade regime, 
                                                 
 48 Ruggie, supra note 38. 
 49 Id. at 393. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 88; see also Reid M. Bolton, Anti-Dumping and Distrust: Reducing Anti-Dumping 
Duties under the W.T.O. Through Heightened Scrutiny, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 66, 69 (2011) 
[hereinafter Bolton] (“Although the ideal remedy would likely be a wholesale reform of the 
Article or outright appeal, those avenues are foreclosed by the complete deadlock of every 
round of trade negotiations over the last decade…”). 
 53 Lang, supra note 36, at 105; Lang emphasizes the particular importance of the 
embedded liberalism framework in our current era of ‘trade and linkage’ debates. 
 54 Id. at 108, 113. 
8
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 41 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol41/iss1/2
26 CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41, 2017] 
 
especially the domestic/international dichotomy, stating that “[embedded 
liberalism] offers a vision of the trade regime in which a commitment to social 
protection was combined with, indeed inseparable from, efforts to liberalize 
international trade…encourage[ing] us to base our thinking on an outdated and 
impractical version of (say) the distinction between international and domestic 
matters…encourage[ing] us to continue conceiving of distributive justice 
concerns primarily within a single-nation optic, rather than on a broader 
foundation.”55 
III. THE CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE: ANTI-DUMPING, EMBEDDED 
LIBERALISM, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
As the foregoing demonstrates, the international use of anti-dumping 
remedies, despite constant criticism of its weak economic underpinning, 
continues to proliferate with little in the way of reform. As such, Leclerc traces a 
path through Canadian anti-dumping policy, pointing out that a Parliamentary 
Sub-Committee review of the Special Import Measures Act (“SIMA”) conducted 
in 1996 concluded that although repealing anti-dumping laws would be the ideal, 
it is not realistic given other countries’ reluctance to embrace Canada’s 
enthusiasm.56 Canada is not the only country enthusiastic to see anti-dumping 
disappear. Canada is only one of various other countries, including Australia, 
that has expressed a desire to repeal anti-dumping law but does not believe that it 
is feasible in the current international trade climate.57 Despite this fact, after 
many decades, the anti-dumping problem remains. 
What the foregoing demonstrates is that the anti-dumping phenomenon is so 
intertwined with the language of ‘(un)fairness’, with both petitioners and the 
public alike relying on such notions to argue for and against anti-dumping 
penalties. Constructivism, and specifically, the notion of embedded liberalism, 
may provide a new lens with which to view this unique and enduring 
phenomenon. While international law generally can be criticized as 
overemphasizing the interests of certain stakeholders over others (i.e. capital 
over labour, governments over domestic groups), 58  this imbalance is quite 
possibly most prominent in the case of anti-dumping law. As one commentator 
puts it, “while consumers may not be an insular minority in general, for the 
purposes of anti-dumping law they have no voice in a broken political process.”59 
It is this specific lack of a voice that contributes to the peculiar status quo of 
anti-dumping, wherein no consensus seems to emerge regarding the constitutive 
‘fairness’ of the trade remedy and no significant progress towards reform 
develops. Alavi and Ahamat reference comments made by Janet Nuzum and 
                                                 
 55 Id. at 97, 99. 
 56 Id. at 123. 
 57 Prusa, supra note 1. 
 58 See Sara Dillon, Opportunism and Trade Law Revisited: The Pseudo-Constitution of the 
WTO, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1005, 1015 (2013). 
 59 Bolton, supra note 52, 88-89. 
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David Rohr, former Commissioners of the International Trade Commission 
(“ITC”), wherein Nuzum and Rohr state that anti-dumping is intended to protect 
producers rather than consumers, and as such, we must expect some cost 
accruing to consumers. 60  However, they question the validity of such an 
assertion,61 and indeed, the fact that the debate surrounding the fairness of anti-
dumping still rages on indicates that anti-dumping reform cannot ignore public 
interest considerations. 
As Zheng persuasively argues, it is this ‘democratic deficit’ which has led to 
not only lack of reform in anti-dumping law, but more importantly, to a lack of 
any clear consensus as to whether the maintenance of anti-dumping is, or is not, 
desirable.62 To put it succinctly, the problem with anti-dumping is that we do not 
fully understand what, from a constitutive sense, the problem actually is. The 
danger, according to Zheng, is not that anti-dumping is protectionist, rather, it is 
that it is the confusion and arbitrariness surrounding perceptions and application 
of anti-dumping which are dangerous to overall trade policy.63 As Zheng states: 
“one way for the two sides in the antidumping debate to engage each other 
is for opponents of antidumping to step back and acknowledge the 
potential value of antidumping as a safety valve, and for supporters of 
antidumping to step back and acknowledge that antidumping may not be 
the best safety valve available.”64 
Zheng implicitly recognizes the constructivist issues at play in the anti-
dumping ‘democratic deficit’, stating that “this democracy deficit in antidumping 
hinders the process by which societal preferences on trade protectionism are 
formed and has implications for the broader trade agenda.”65 As such, Zheng 
advocates for the imposition of a mandatory public interest component in anti-
dumping processes. The significance of this recommendation is that it embraces 
the essential tension at the heart of the anti-dumping debate, bringing all 
stakeholders into the discussion to move past the status quo debates surrounding 
economic ‘(un)fairness’: 
“By focusing on the “unfair” nature of the dumped imports, antidumping 
allows domestic interest groups to appeal to the superficial righteousness 
of protecting domestic producers from import competition and shields the 
real questions about trade protectionism from being scrutinized and 
debated in a meaningful manner… The question of what effect 
antidumping has on consumers and downstream users also becomes much 
less relevant when the overriding concern is about the “fairness” of the 
                                                 
 60 Rokiah Alavi & Haniff Ahamat, Predation and Public Interest in the WTO Anti-
Dumping Duty Determination: a Malaysian Case, 25 J. ECON. COOPERATION AMONG ISLAMIC 
COUNTRIES 61, 61-81 (2004). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Wentong Zheng, Reforming Trade Remedies, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 151, 158 (2012). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 166 
 65 Id. at 176. 
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imports. With this “unfair trade” rhetoric hijacking the antidumping 
process, there are no honest debates on whether and at what costs the 
importing country needs trade protection in the form of antidumping 
duties.”66 
Zheng identifies the political core at the centre of the anti-dumping debate, a 
core that is far more complex than the typical language of ‘(un)fair’ trade. In 
advocating for a mandatory public interesting inquiry, Zheng states that “the 
public interest clause is intended to transform the trade remedy process from a 
mechanical one based on formulas and number-crunching to a political one based 
on bargaining and compromise.”67 
Zheng is not alone in his identification of the need for greater public interest 
involvement, and in recent years, an increasing number of scholars have 
advocated for inclusion of a mandatory ‘public interest’ inquiry in anti-dumping 
processes.68 The growing number of voices moving past the ‘traditional’ fair 
versus unfair debate reflects recognition of the complex domestic socioeconomic 
forces animating international trade norms. Bi explicitly addresses this link, 
calling for greater consumer participation in anti-dumping investigations by 
incorporating ‘public interest’ determinations as a first step in the process.69 
Particularly, Bi traces the path from the development of domestic norms to the 
international forum, stating that after incorporating a reform package including a 
mandatory ‘public interest’ inquiry, “it might then be possible to bring the issue 
of antidumping on the agenda of multilateral negotiations again.”70 
The reality is that few jurisdictions provide public interest participatory 
rights. “The [Anti-Dumping] Agreement does not include industrial users and 
consumers in a compulsory list of interested parties; this issue is left to the 
discretion of individual Members. In practice, the domestic laws of WTO 
Members rarely specify the possibility for industrial users and consumers to 
become an interested party.” 71  Viewing the anti-dumping dilemma from an 
embedded liberalism perspective, the lack of domestic consumer voice in the 
anti-dumping debate is a significant impediment to the development of a 
constitutive international framework regarding what exactly anti-dumping should 
look like. Acknowledging an embedded liberalism view of international trade 
relations demands that we empower the public interest voice within the anti-
dumping framework, to slowly move from respective domestic forums towards 
international consensus on the constitutive dimension of anti-dumping. To 
paraphrase Kotsiubska, inclusion of public interest consideration into anti-
                                                 
 66 Id. at 180-181. 
 67 Id. at 190-191. 
 68 Id. at 180. 
 69 Ying Bi, Is Dumping Still Harmful? New Thinking on Antidumping in the Global Free 
Trade, 6 J. E. ASIA INT’L L. 29, 49-50 (2013). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Viktoriia Kotsiubska, Public Interest Consideration in Domestic and International Anti-
dumping Disciplines (Sept. 2011) (unpublished Master’s Thesis, University of Bern) (on file at 
the World Trade Institute). 
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dumping processes in various countries will contribute to an overall better 
understanding of the public interest issues relevant to all WTO Members.72 
IV. CANADIAN ANTI-DUMPING LAW 
A. The Canadian Perspective: Political-Economic Statistics Regarding Anti-dumping 
and ‘Protectionism’ 
Canadian anti-dumping practice has improved tremendously over the last 
three decades. Statistics indicate that Canadian anti-dumping filing intensity is 
nearly one eighth what it was thirty years ago.73 Furthermore, Canada’s ‘new 
user’ North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) partner, Mexico, has 
surpassed Canada in anti-dumping activity over the last twenty-five years. 74 
However, despite Canada’s tremendous progress in reducing anti-dumping 
activity, it can still be considered one of the most active anti-dumping 
proponents. As Bown points out, Canada is the best in a bad lot. Canada trailed 
only the other traditional users, the United States, Australia, and the E.U., in the 
number of anti-dumping investigations undertaken between 1981 and 2001, and 
ranked as the seventh most active user during the 1995-2004 period.75 
However, Bown indicates that raw statistics regarding ‘improvement’ in 
Canadian anti-dumping practice disguise the nuances of the socio-political 
realities surrounding Canadian anti-dumping practices. In particular, NAFTA 
may have resulted in the emergence of latent forms of discrimination in 
Canadian anti-dumping practices. Bown cites the disproportionately low 
percentage of anti-dumping duties imposed on U.S. imports as compared to the 
percentage of all imports coming into Canada, as indication of subtle 
discriminatory practices pervasive throughout Canadian anti-dumping activity.76 
While it is unlikely that Canadian authorities blatantly intend to discriminate 
between U.S. and non-U.S. imports, Bown posits that the integration and 
intertwining of the Canadian and U.S. economies resulting from NAFTA has 
resulted in political/economic parties joining forces to defend their combined 
interests, resulting in added pressure for protectionism through anti-dumping 
activity.77 
The Canadian context of latent discrimination in anti-dumping practice is 
unsettling for two reasons. Primarily, while Canadian practice has been able to 
discriminate in favour of U.S. imports, at least one study indicates that U.S. anti-
dumping activity has not been equally as favourable towards Canadian exports to 
                                                 
 72 Id. at 46. 
 73 Prusa, supra note 1, at 692; this decrease in filing intensity is a trend similar to all 
traditional users over the last two decades. 
 74 Id. at 690. 
 75 Chad P. Bown, Canada’s Anti-dumping and Safeguard Policies: Overt and Subtle 
Forms of Discrimination, 30 WORLD ECON. 1457, 1460 (2007) [hereinafter Bown]; see also 
Prusa, supra note 1, at 23. 
 76 See Bown, supra note 75, at 1462-1463. 
 77 Id. at 1463, 1473. 
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the United States. As Blonigen’s analysis indicates, NAFTA (and its Chapter 19 
dispute settlement mechanism) has had little effect on U.S. anti-dumping activity 
against its NAFTA partners. 78  The same also holds true for Mexican anti-
dumping practice post-NAFTA. 79  These statistics lead to a second major 
concern. With the growing proliferation of regional trade agreements (“RTAs”) 
and free trade agreements (“FTAs”) across the world, the Canadian perspective 
may be an indication of symptomatic forms of discrimination arising from a 
scattered web of international trade agreements. To put it simply, even in the 
absence of anti-dumping processes in their current form, the constitutive 
‘protectionist’ tendencies may simply reconstitute themselves in new forms and 
modalities. Without identifying the cause and nature of these constitutive 
behaviours and providing a structured base of rules to address them, these 
behaviours may result in discriminatory practices contrary to the spirit of the 
WTO. 
B. The Application of s. 45 – ‘Public Interest’ 
As one scholar has put it, “the presence of a public interest in Canada’s trade 
legislation is unique among trading nations,”80 placing Canada among a handful 
of countries including, for example, Brazil, Paraguay, Thailand, Malaysia, China, 
and countries in the E.U. Canada’s public interest clause is found under section 
45 of the SIMA, 81  the legislation governing Canadian anti-dumping law. 
Furthermore, the Special Import Measures Regulations (“Regulations”)82 provide 
additional guidance regarding the application of the public interest inquiry. In 
practice, public interest is only taken into consideration following a positive 
injury determination by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (“CITT”), 
thus making the process somewhat bifurcated. The Regulations provide a broad 
definition of ‘interested parties’ for the purposes of a public interest hearing, and 
interested parties may request standing within twenty-one days of the notice of 
hearing. 83  Based on the submissions presented at the hearing, the CITT 
recommends to the Minister whether anti-dumping duties should be reduced, 
eliminated completely, or neither.84 
Despite the accolades bestowed upon Canada for attempting to counter the 
welfare reducing effects of anti-dumping with a public interest inquiry, the 
reality is that the public interest test has historically been perceived as largely 
ineffective. Between the early 1980s to the late 2000s, the CITT had conducted 
only eleven public interest hearings, and of these, only four led to a finding that 
                                                 
 78 Bruce A. Blonigen, The Effects of NAFTA on Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Activity, 19 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 407, 409, 416, 419 (2005). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Stevens, supra note 7, at 7. 
 81 Special Important Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c S-15, § 35 (Can.) [hereinafter SIMA]. 
 82 Special Important Measures Regulations, S.O.R./84-927 (Can.) [hereinafter 
Regulations]. 
 83 Id. at § 40.1(4). 
 84 SIMA, at § 45(4) (It is important to note that these recommendations are not binding on 
the Minister). 
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public interest had been detrimentally affected by the imposition of anti-dumping 
duties.85 Furthermore, the CITT had never removed the duty completely, but 
rather had always recommended a tariff reduction.86 
Stevens has conducted a comprehensive review of Canadian anti-dumping 
jurisprudence, and specifically, public interest under the SIMA. 87 Stevens 
indicates that the CITT’s claim in Fibreglass Pipe88 that “the primary object of 
[the SIMA] is to protect Canadian producers from injury caused by dumped or 
subsidized imports,” is the foundation of ‘producer bias’ in public interest cases, 
causing the CITT to give little weight to evidence of drastic price increases and 
anti-competitive after-effects of anti-dumping duties. 89  However, the main 
concern arising from this predicament is the inconsistency with which the CITT 
has applied the public interest test. The CITT has often applied a reasoning that 
seems to run entirely counter to the proposition in Fibreglass Pipe, and as such, 
has left interested parties under s. 45 with little guidance in preparing for public 
interest hearings.90 
Stevens points to the Grain Corn91 and Beer92 cases, the earliest positive s. 
45 decisions, as examples of the counter-intuitive reasoning applied by the CITT 
when considering public interest. In both cases, the CITT engaged in a balancing 
of producer and public interests, considered entirely in terms of economic factors 
such as price and market effects, in concluding that reductions in tariffs were 
appropriate. This type of balancing of economic interests had been explicitly 
rejected by the CITT in Fibreglass Pipe, and subsequent cases such as Caps, 
Lids and Jars,93 and Flat Hot-Rolled Carbon.94 
In two more relatively recent positive s. 45 decisions, Prepared Baby Food95 
and Contrast Media,96 the CITT considered public health interests in addition to 
the prevailing economic factors such as anti-competitive effects and supply 
shortages. As Stevens indicates, the most concerning aspect about these 
decisions is that a significant proportion of the evidence submitted to the CITT 
regarding public health issues was largely anecdotal, with very little statistical 
research to substantiate the claims.97 However, in Caps, Lids and Jars, despite 
substantial evidence presented regarding public health issues, the CITT 
disregarded this evidence as “insufficient to merit intervention.”98 The CITT, in 
                                                 
 85 Stevens, supra note 7, at 15. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Reference Re Preformed Fibreglass Pipe Insulation, C.I.T.T. PB-93-001 (Jan. 28, 1994). 
 89 Stevens, supra note 7, at 15, 19. 
 90 Id. at 19. 
 91 Reference Re Grain Corn Public Interest, C.I.T.T. MN-89-002 (Dec. 29, 1989). 
 92 Reference Re Beer, C.I.T.T. NQ-91-002 (Nov. 9, 1992). 
 93 Reference Re Caps, Lids and Jars, C.I.T.T. PB-95-001 (Feb. 26, 1996). 
 94 Prusa, supra note 1, at 16. 25; Reference Re Flat and Hot-Rolled Carbon, C.I.T.T. NQ 
98-004 (Sep. 3, 1999). 
 95 Reference Re Certain Prepared Baby Food, C.I.T.T. NQ-97-002 CITT (Nov. 30, 1998). 
 96 Reference Re Certain Iodinated Contrast Media, C.I.T.T. NQ-99-003 (Aug. 29, 2000). 
 97 Stevens, supra note 7, at 22. 
 98 Id. 
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Caps, Lids and Jars, defined the standard justifying intervention to protect public 
interest as requiring “compelling or special” circumstances. In Grain Corn, the 
CITT stated that public interest provisions should only be applied on an 
“exceptional basis.” 99  However, in Prepared Baby Food, the standard was 
defined as “sufficiently compelling.”100 
Ciuriak summarizes the four main successful public interest cases before the 
CITT, and the CITT’s reasoning for reducing duties, as follows: 
 
“Beer: consumer benefits and increased competition in the like goods 
industry; 
Prepared baby food: income distribution and children’s health tempered by 
communitarian concerns about the impact of elimination of tariffs on the 
Canadian producer’s community; 
Iodinated contrast media: healthcare externalities for patients and cost 
implications for hospitals; and 
Stainless steel wire: downstream industry competitiveness.”101 
 
As Ciuriak points out, while the CITT to date has shed “some light on its 
views as to what a public interest test is not, it is less helpful in identifying what 
it is.”102 According to Ciuriak, when trying to reconcile the confused CITT line 
of cases regarding ‘public interest’ and anti-dumping duties, “if one may be 
permitted a generalization, the Tribunal sees the purpose of duties as being to 
restore competition, albeit on a qualified, “fair” basis, not to eliminate it.”103 
Furthermore, he states that the only apparent common element, if any, in these 
decisions is the lack of an alternative supply of goods where duties were 
prohibitive: 
“When duties have prohibitive effects on imports, the Tribunal tends to be 
sympathetic towards redress. Accordingly, in terms of its statutory criteria, 
limited availability of the subject goods for downstream users is clearly the 
principal consideration for the Tribunal. In this regard, the Tribunal 
considers the availability of domestic and alternative sources of import 
supply and, as well, whether there is continued supply of the subject goods, 
in particular from suppliers facing low margins of dumping or 
subsidisation. If these conditions are met, it is unlikely that the other 
factors listed in the regulations – e.g., impacts on competition in the market 
                                                 
 99 C.I.T.T. MN-89-002, supra note 91, at 2. 
 100 Id. at 27. 
 101 Dan Ciuriak, Trade Defence Practice in Canada: Canada Country Report for the 
Evaluation of the European Union’s Trade Defence Instruments 91 (Ctr. for Int’l Governance 
Innovation, Working Paper No. SI2.581682, 2012) [hereinafter Ciuriak]. 
 102 Id. at 81. 
 103 Id. at 83. 
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or on the competitive position of downstream users – will be judged to be 
significantly impaired.”104 
Furthermore, Ciuriak highlights the unfortunate fact that public interest 
inquiries take place not only after the injury determination rather than as part of 
it, but also only after the CITT decides that a public interest inquiry is 
warranted.105  He states that this raises serious transparency issues, given the 
appearance that “the real public interest test is conducted by the Tribunal prior to 
the full investigation; the full investigation is primarily, it would appear, to 
validate the internal review and to determine the extent to which duties should be 
lowered.”106 
Some could characterize the history of ‘public interest’ practice in Canadian 
anti-dumping law as a case study in disappointment and missed opportunity. 
However, these conclusions depend entirely on the perspective from which one 
views the situation, especially considering recent developments. Specifically, the 
recent Concrete Reinforcing Bar 107  CITT decision, followed by the Gypsum 
Board Reference108 demonstrate a genesis in public interest participation in anti-
dumping processes that is unique to global anti-dumping practice. 
The anti-dumping inquiry was initiated by several manufacturers of steel 
products, including ArcelorMittal Long Products Canada, AltaSteel Ltd., and 
Gerdau Ameristeel Corporation. The mobilization of parties, both in favour of 
and opposed to, reduction or elimination of duties was substantial and diverse in 
the history of Canadian public interest inquiries. Twenty-eight parties 
participated in the inquiry, including local governments (provincial and 
municipal), foreign governments, various unions, trade associations, and 
professional associations.109 
In a tip of the hat to what Stevens called the ‘producer bias’ inherent in 
Canada’s public interest inquiry, the CITT stated that it “considers it established 
that the imposition of duties following an inquiry under section 42 of SIMA is in 
the public interest”110 and that the purpose of the (apparently redundantly named) 
‘public interest’ inquiry “is to determine whether the duties have unintended 
consequences such that it would be in the public interest to consider their 
elimination or reduction. If such is the case, the Tribunal will need to assess 
whether and in what way these public interest concerns can be mitigated.”111 
The CITT set out a list of unintended consequences for which a reduction or 
elimination of duties would be justified. 112  This list contained a number of 
‘qualifying’ terms, including “undue reduction of competition in the domestic 
                                                 
 104 Id. at 83. 
 105 Id. at 140. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Reference Re Concrete Reinforcing Bar, C.I.T.T. NQ-2014-001 (Dec. 22, 2015). 
 108 Reference Re Gypsum Board, C.I.T.T. GC-2016-001 (Jan. 19, 2017). 
 109 See id. at 2 (includes full list). 
 110 Id. at 14. 
 111 Id. at 15. 
 112 Id. 
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market, which might lead to unnecessarily high prices”, “unacceptable reduction 
in choice, quality or quantity of product for consumers,” “significant damage to 
downstream users,” and “damage to some aspect of society considered to have an 
overwhelming priority, such as health, safety, education, or public or national 
security” (emphasis added).113 Unfortunately, the CITT did not provide much 
guidance regarding the interpretation of these terms so as to provide meaningful 
guidance. Ultimately, the CITT rejected the arguments put forth by the three 
overarching public interest groups representing downstream users of rebar 
(fabricators and developers), purchasers of condominium units, and the B.C. 
government and taxpayers bearing the costs of public infrastructure: 
“In the Tribunal’s view, the current global picture of the B.C. rebar market 
appears to reflect a competitive market for fairly traded rebar, with 
multiple sources of supply and prices that respond to supply and demand, 
as well as factors such as fluctuations in the price of scrap and the strength 
of the Canadian dollar. The duties thus seem to have had their intended 
consequences of neutralizing the effects of unfair trade practices while 
allowing market forces to generate a new competitive environment for 
fairly traded goods.”114 
“[N]o persuasive evidence has been adduced in this case to show that such 
effects represent anything more than the normal and intended 
consequences of the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties 
or to show that any difficulties faced by fabricators cannot be overcome. 
On the contrary, the evidence indicates that fabricators currently have 
access to low world rebar prices from multiple sources which, in the 
Tribunal’s view, will allow them to continue to compete for business in the 
admittedly highly competitive rebar fabrication market in British 
Columbia, notwithstanding any changes in their operations that may be 
necessary as a result of the new market conditions.”115 
The CITT highlighted the availability of potential supplies from foreign 
sources, including from suppliers in Japan and Hong Kong, as a key mitigating 
factor against the reduction of anti-dumping duties.116 With respect to real estate 
pricing, the CITT stated that real estate pricing is driven “by other, far more 
significant factors” than subject goods, rejecting the notion that reduction or 
elimination of duties would have a significant effect on real estate prices.117 
Shortly after this ruling was released, many of the same initiating parties in 
the Concrete Reinforcing Bar case, including ArcelorMittal Long Products 
Canada, AltaSteel Ltd., and Gerdau Ameristeel Corporation filed an anti-
dumping complaint against rebar imported from countries including Chinese 
                                                 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 17. 
 115 Id. at 17-18. 
 116 Id. at 19. 
 117 Id. 
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Taipei, Hong Kong, and Japan.118 These countries comprise many of the same 
countries cited by the CITT in Concrete Reinforcing Bar as alternative suppliers 
of rebar. This behaviour calls into question the (un)competitive strategy of the 
domestic manufacturers. There has been substantial public backlash from both 
the decision in Concrete Reinforcing Bar as well as subsequent conduct of the 
initiating parties.119 These individuals have expressed dissatisfaction not only 
with anti-dumping law generally, but their perception of Canada’s seemingly 
flawed public interest inquiry. 
All of the foregoing dissatisfaction has culminated in the recent Gypsum 
Board Reference. The Gypsum Board Reference is unique not only to Canadian 
public interest processes, but to international anti-dumping generally. As one 
commentator states with respect to the Gypsum Board Reference: “[t]his has 
never happened before. This is very important. Trade lawyers outside Canada 
(and inside Canada) will be shocked by the steps being taken in Canada during 
an active anti-dumping proceeding.”120 
In June of 2016, the Canada Border Services Agency (“CBSA”) initiated an 
investigation following a complaint filed by CertainTeed Gypsum Canada Inc. 
(“CTG”). In September of 2016, the CBSA finalized a preliminary determination 
of dumping along with provisional anti-dumping duties ranging from 105% to 
276.5%.121 
It is at this point that the inquiry took an entirely unique turn. The Governor 
in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Finance, directed the CITT 
to inquire into “whether the imposition of provisional duties or duties, applicable 
to gypsum board imported from the United States for markets in Western 
Canada, is contrary to Canada’s economic, trade or commercial interests, and 
specifically whether such an imposition has or would have the effect of 
substantially reducing competition in this market or causing significant harm to 
consumers of those goods or to businesses who use them.”122 
The novelty of this inquiry lies in the fact that this was the first time in 
Canadian history that the broader economic impact inquiry was conducted 
simultaneously with the injury inquiry, rather than post-injury determination.123 
Furthermore, the Gypsum Board Reference was conducted pursuant to Section 18 
of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act, rather than the standard 
                                                 
 118 See CAN. BORDER SERV. AGENCY, CERTAIN CONCRETE REINFORCING BAR: NOTICE OF 
INITIATION OF AN INVESTIGATION (Aug. 19, 2016). 
 119 See Namkik Ekinci, Rebar in the Public Interest, FIN. POST (May 19, 2015), 
http://business.financialpost.com/fp-comment/rebar-in-the-public-interest. 
 120 Cyndee Cherniak, Canada Acknowledges Antidumping Proceedings Hurt Consumers, 
CAN.-U.S. BLOG (Oct. 19, 2016), http://www.canada-usblog.com/2016/10/19/canada-
acknowledges-antidumping-proceedings-hurt-consumers/. 
 121 C.I.T.T. GC-2016-001, supra note 108, at 1-2. 
 122 Id. at 3. 
 123 See Gordon LaFortune, Consumer and Business groups now can have a voice in the 
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Section 45 inquiry pursuant to SIMA, which allows the Governor in Council to 
refer to the CITT for inquiry or report “any matter in relation to the economic, 
trade or commercial interests of Canada with respect to any goods or services”. 
The Gypsum Board Reference is the first time such a reference has been 
conducted in almost two decades and the first reference relating to an ongoing 
anti-dumping proceeding.124 
The CITT received a massive 108 notices of participation for the inquiry, 
which included Canadian producers, unions, distributors, suppliers, home 
builders and Members of Parliament.125 The CITT concluded that the imposition 
of the proposed duties “will substantially reduce competition in Western Canada, 
ha[ve] caused and will continue to cause significant harm to businesses who use 
them, and harm consumers of those goods.126 The CITT based its conclusion on 
several important findings. Primarily, the evidence suggested that the imposition 
of duties would have the immediate effect of turning Canadian consumers away 
from imported product towards the domestic producer, CTG. This was 
problematic given the historical evidence of CTG’s inability to adequately 
supply Western Canada with product.127 The imposition of duties limited the 
availability of imported supply of product to Western Canada, and a number of 
other factors, including quality, and limited domestic purchasers’ ability to turn 
to other imported sources.128 As such, the CITT concluded that “the imposition 
of duties, in their full amount, in respect of imports of the subject goods will 
have the effect of substantially reducing competition in the Western Canadian 
market in the future, including losses in sources of supply, excessive price 
increases and reduced consumer choice.”129 
Interestingly, when assessing potential harm to Canadian consumers, the 
CITT mimicked its traditional language in Section 45 inquiries, stating that 
higher prices are a natural result of anti-dumping duties and as such, on a prima 
facie basis, are in the public interest absent unintended or unwanted 
consequences.130 The CITT concluded that the imposed duties would cause harm 
to businesses who intend to use the product. 131  The CITT’s conclusion was 
largely based on evidence of home builders and other construction contractors 
entering into long-term agreements at pre-duty prices132; a rationale that seemed 
to be given little weight by the CITT in the Concrete Reinforcing Bar decision. 
Adding to the entirely unique nature of this Reference, the CITT specifically 
pointed out the need to factor assistance for rebuilding Fort McMurray following 
the devastating fire of May 2016, which destroyed approximately 1,600 
                                                 
 124 Cyndee Cherniak, What is a CITT Section 18 Reference?, CAN.-U.S. BLOG (Oct. 24, 
2016), http://www.canada-usblog.com/2016/10/24/what-is-a-citt-section-18-reference/. 
 125 C.I.T.T. GC-2016-001, supra note 108, at 3-4. 
 126 Id. at 1. 
 127 Id. at 17. 
 128 Id. at 18. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 19. 
 131 Id. at 21. 
 132 Id. at 21. 
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residential and non-residential structures.133 The CITT highlighted the relatively 
large number of uninsured and under-insured home owners affected by the fire, a 
number potentially as high as twenty percent of the total number of home 
owners, and the effect that duties might have on these individuals during the 
rebuilding process.134 Although not providing specific quantification of how this 
disaster should tie into duty calculation, the CITT did emphasize that this reality 
weighed into their overall consideration of the unintended consequences. 
The CITT summarized its conclusion by stating that: 
“the imposition of the provisional duties in this case led to unintended or 
unwanted effects. The sudden increase in prices threw a market previously 
characterized by relatively stable prices and predictable annual price 
changes into disarray. This situation generated large unexpected losses for 
downstream businesses using gypsum board, causing significant harm to 
these industries. It has harmed consumers through unwanted increases of 
overall construction and renovation costs for homes due to rising prices for 
gypsum board. It will, in the future, result in a substantial reduction in 
competition with several accompanying negative effects.”135 
The CITT recommended that the provisional duties that had been collected 
to date be retained by the Federal government and used to refund the higher costs 
for imported and domestically produced gypsum board purchased since the 
imposition of the provisional duties.136 Furthermore, the CITT recommended that 
final duties on any cooperating exporters should not exceed forty-three percent of 
the export price, a significant decrease from the originally proposed duties.137 At 
the time of writing, the Minister of Finance had not yet released a statement as to 
what would be done following receipt of the CITT’s recommendations. 
C. The Constitutive Dimension of Canadian Anti-dumping Practice 
Stevens offers a number of theories which she indicates may be used as an 
‘interpretative tool’ with which to analyze the prevalence of producer bias in 
public interest hearings.138  These theories include the tariff-formation model, 
which states that results of public interest hearings are influenced by the relative 
turnout of interested parties (either producers or public interest groups),139 and 
the political support theory, which states that the CITT is in a ‘political’ position, 
weighing producer interests against general social welfare.140 Summarizing the 
considerations involved in each of these theories, Stevens states that “the best 
                                                 
 133 Id. at 33. 
 134 Id. at 34. 
 135 Id. at 23. 
 136 Id. at 36. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Stevens, supra note 7, at 26. 
 139 Id. at 25-26. 
 140 Id. at 29. 
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interpretive tool is one that combines the political economy of the process with 
the specific economic traits underlying each market system addressed.”141 
The most insightful conclusion that Stevens draws from her interpretative 
analysis is that the ‘free rider problem’ is perhaps the most significant issue 
preventing greater consideration of the public interest in anti-dumping activity. 
The welfare losses resulting from the imposition of duties is spread so thin across 
the entire population that it is either unfeasible or unrealistic to expect public 
interest to play a large enough role in anti-dumping inquiries in order to counter 
the producer bias inherent in the process.142 Hence, in the Grain Corn and Beer 
cases, it was large down-stream users, not general public interest groups acting 
on behalf of consumers, which acted as interested parties in the hearings. 
Furthermore, in Prepared Baby Food, the turnout of public interest groups was 
possibly the largest mobilization of interested parties acting on behalf of direct 
consumers in the history of Canadian anti-dumping law. 
To put Stevens’ point succinctly, the reason public interest has not been a 
more effective counter to producer bias in anti-dumping activity is because the 
public is simply not interested, at least not as interested as producers who wield 
the resources and power to put their interest into practice. Thus, at the domestic 
level, the challenge lies in searching for ways to mobilize sufficient public 
interest groups in order to counter the efforts of large producers. 
Prior to Stevens, Leclerc had conducted a survey of CITT decisions in an 
attempt to draw conclusions regarding possibilities for anti-dumping reform in 
Canada.143 Similar to Stevens, Leclerc points to the CITT’s reasoning in cases 
such as Fibreglass Pipe and Caps, Lids and Jars as creating a precedent which 
does not allow balancing of consumer and producer interests. Instead, the CITT 
must focus on dumping margins and injury and can only deviate when public 
interest is “sufficiently compelling… to warrant a departure from the primary 
object of SIMA.”144 Thus, Leclerc states that “SIMA seems to either assume that 
harm to a domestic industry is in and of itself harmful to Canada’s overall 
economic welfare, or treats Canada’s overall economic welfare as irrelevant to 
the determination of harm.”145 Leclerc concludes that “a narrow interpretation of 
the words ‘public interest’, combined with the strict standard of review that 
would likely apply to decisions of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal, has 
resulted in virtually meaningless public interest inquiries that rarely affect the 
imposition of anti-dumping duties.”146 
                                                 
 141 Id. at 26. 
 142 Id. at 28; see also Wu, supra note 11, at 27-28, (“Furthermore, public choice theory 
explains why consumers, who are hurt by rising prices caused by antidumping tariffs, do not 
pressure their governments for reform. The negative welfare cost of antidumping duties is 
diffused across a large number of consumers; the cost borne by any individual consumer is 
therefore small…”). 
 143 Jean-Marc Leclerc, Reforming Anti-Dumping Law: Balancing the Interests of 
Consumers and Domestic Industries 44 McGill L.J. 111 (1999) [hereinafter Leclerc]. 
 144 Id. at 127. See also C.I.T.T. 27 PB-93-001, supra note 88, at ¶ 14. 
 145 Leclerc, supra note 143, at 122. 
 146 Id. at 111. 
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Leclerc’s statement brings us full circle to the wager of embedded liberalism 
– in international trade law more than simple economics is at stake. The paradox 
that Leclerc perceives in the CITT’s application of Canadian anti-dumping law 
results from an implicit assumption that anti-dumping law is purely economic in 
nature. However, a broader perspective which embraces the constitutive realities 
at play, both at the international level and at the Canadian domestic level, may 
assist in uncovering a concealed image of anti-dumping law, one that combines 
laissez-faire economics with various perceptions of legitimacy and social 
purpose required to ‘embed liberalism’. Hence, concepts of ‘harm’ may 
encompass different dimensions and perceptions beyond pure economic 
indicators such as price increases and market distortions. 
Leclerc implicitly realizes the reality of embedded liberalism in anti-
dumping law when he states that “some kinds of government policy are not 
based on economic concerns, but rather on shared concerns for social welfare…  
on decidedly non-economic concerns like “nationhood”, “communitarianism”, or 
“fairness”… [T]o confine an analysis of anti-dumping law to concerns of 
economic efficiency alone would ignore these less tangible values… ”147 Ciuriak 
also highlights the relative lack of consideration for non-economic 
considerations, such as social, environmental, or political issues in the public 
interest inquiry, and in this respect, focusing exclusively on economic factors 
may bolster the compliance of Canada’s public interest inquiry with the WTO 
Agreement.148 Despite this fact, Ciuriak states that some practitioners believe it is 
necessary to bring non-economic social effects into the public interest inquiry in 
order for it to be successful.149 
What the years of confusion and disappointment have created is an 
environment with no consensus on either the definite benefits or disadvantages of 
anti-dumping law in its current form or the application of Canada’s public 
interest inquiry. Recent cases have added layers of complexity; specifically, the 
Concrete Reinforcing Bar and Gypsum Board Reference cases involved large 
numbers of stakeholders, each group making a persuasive argument for the 
advantages/disadvantages of anti-dumping duties in the specific context of each 
case. Some might argue that this lack of consensus is the culmination of three 
decades of misguided Canadian legislation. 
Rather, the confusion itself, and the political processes it has unleashed, may 
be sufficient justification in and of themselves. The attempt to create a public 
interest space in Canada’s anti-dumping process, and the debate fomented there 
within, is the solution. This conclusion may seem like a half-hearted attempt to 
find some justification or meaning within decades of confused and unsatisfactory 
public interest inquiry processes. The developments currently taking place in 
Canada, which are unique not only to Canada but to global anti-dumping law 
generally, have emerged within the public interest sphere in Canada’s anti-
dumping forum; developments which are changing the norms of not only public 
                                                 
 147 Id. at 122. 
 148 Ciuriak, supra note 101, at 140. 
 149 Id. 
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interest inquiries but of anti-dumping law generally. These emerging norms are 
manifesting themselves in new legal modalities that have the potential to 
transcend the Canadian domestic sphere into the broader international trade 
forum. 
In this sense, despite the confusion and disappointment, Canada is still much 
farther ahead than most nations with respect to developing legitimate norms 
towards the potential of true reform. Novel transformations of anti-dumping 
practice, processes, and perceptions have emerged from recent Canadian cases, 
of which transformations are unique both domestically and internationally. 
Perhaps continuing down the current path will materialize in a final, definitive 
answer regarding the benefits and/or disadvantages of anti-dumping practice. Or, 
the solution may be that there is no definitive answer and that anti-dumping law 
is destined to remain politicized. Such a conclusion should not be viewed as a 
failure. Perhaps the solution is to create a ‘political’ space, accessible through a 
public inquiry mechanism, which functions based on a definitive set of 
procedural rules capable of consistent, non-discriminatory application amongst 
nations; rules viewed as being fair and legitimate. 
The key lesson from recent Canadian public interest practice is that the 
public interest space appears to provide a testing ground from which the 
necessary conclusions can be derived. Imagine if a similar public interest inquiry 
mechanism was available in jurisdictions around the world. Similar case studies 
to those developed in Canada would create a body of evidence from which the 
necessary conclusions can be drawn at the domestic level, extrapolated 
internationally, and international rules could be developed. 
The enduring nature of anti-dumping practice insinuates that at the heart of 
this trade remedy lies a politicized core. To deny this would be naïve at best, and 
willfully ignorant at worst. The embedded liberalism view takes this rationale 
one step further, telling us that at the heart of international trade generally lies a 
political core, a core around which compromise must be forged to secure the 
international liberal trade order. Perhaps the persistence of the anti-dumping 
remedy is testament to this fact, and that anti-dumping practice more than any 
other area of international trade law necessitates the inclusion of a public interest 
inquiry. What public interest processes, spread out across various jurisdictions 
around the world, can teach us may be valuable not only for anti-dumping 
reform, rather, the experiences gained may provide valuable lessons about the 
liberalized international trade order generally. 
V. EMBEDDED LIBERALISM AND POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM 
A. Canada and the International Forum 
Canada’s efforts to reform anti-dumping practice, both domestically and 
internationally, have been widely acknowledged. Renowned international 
economist Aradhna Aggarwal has suggested a reform package for the WTO 
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ADA that bears a striking resemblance to the SIMA and the Regulations.150 
Primarily, Aggarwal suggests that the WTO ADA be amended to include a 
public interest clause, with enumerated factors for consideration similar to those 
in the Regulations.151 The ‘public interest’ test would mimic the ‘injury’ test 
under the ADA, with a list of factors which every Member would be obligated to 
consider when applying anti-dumping laws. This addition would add 
tremendously to international harmonization of anti-dumping laws, and 
ultimately bolster legitimacy. The WTO Appellate Body has previously stated 
that of the fifteen factors enumerated under the ADA, ‘injury’ tests are 
mandatory, in that Members must assess them in “an economically and factually 
correct manner.”152 Thus, if the ADA incorporated a public inquiry test similar to 
the injury test, Members would have recourse to the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body (“DSB”) to challenge other Members’ insufficient consideration of such 
enumerated factors. 
Despite the rejection of the addition of a public interest provision in the 
ADA during the previous WTO Uruguay round, Canada submitted proposals for 
such an addition during the Doha Round,153 demonstrating an ongoing desire to 
keep this issue alive. Most notably, Canada submitted a proposal which suggests 
bringing the ADA further into harmonization with the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures. 154  This proposal embodies the Canadian 
constitutive position far greater than any other proposal. While Canada 
recognizes the need for some protectionism under ‘legitimate’ circumstances, 
continuing efforts should be made to refine and align perceptions of legitimacy 
with objectively definable factors such as illegal subsidies under the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
B. Canada and the Domestic Forum 
The proposals for reform at the international level assist in defining the 
Canadian constitutive position regarding legitimacy and anti-dumping. However, 
an entirely ‘rules based’ approach, internationally governed through the WTO 
institutional mechanism, causes a number of concerns. Primarily, how can civil 
society, namely consumer groups, engage the WTO system in order to protect 
their own interests? In the event that a Member state does not bring an action 
against a state imposing anti-dumping duties against it, what recourse do such 
                                                 
 150 Aradhna Aggarwal, The WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement: Possible Reform Through the 
Inclusions of a Public Interest Clause, 4, 9 (Indian Council for Research on Int’l Econ. Rel., 
Working Paper No. 142, 2004). 
 151 Id. at 10. 
 152 EDWIN VERMULST, THE WTO ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT: A COMMENTARY 95 (2006); 
see also Report Re Thailand – Anti-dumping duties on angles, shapes and sections of iron or 
non-alloy steel and H-beams from Poland, W.T.O WT/DS122/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) 7.236-
7.237. 
 153 J. Michael Finger & Andrei Zlate, WTO Rules That Allow New Trade Restrictions: The 
Public Interest Is a Bastard Child (U.N. Millennium Project Task Force on Trade, Paper, 
2003), 26-29 (TN/RL/W/1, 04/15/02 & TN/RL/W/1, 01/28/03) [hereinafter Finger & Zlate II]. 
 154 Id. (TN/RL/W/1, 01/28/03). 
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groups have available to them within the WTO system? Furthermore, even if a 
Member state does bring an action against an imposing state, would such civil 
groups present amicus briefs and submissions against their own home states? 
Although it has seen considerable improvement, the WTO is still plagued by 
institutional illegitimacy due to the inability to incorporate civil society groups 
(such as Non-Governmental Organizations and other non-state actors) into the 
DSB; the WTO DSB has either systematically disregarded the submissions of 
civil society groups, or has only recognized them when joined with a 
participating Member state’s submissions.155 Several recent proposals provide 
suggestions for greater consumer participation at the WTO, including the 
possibility of government funding for consumer advocacy groups, which would 
engage in public interest hearings on the behalf of consumers and other aspects 
of under-represented civil society. 
However, beyond the procedural institutional issues, this tension is 
symptomatic of the inability of formal ‘rules based’ legitimacy to encompass and 
provide a forum for the resolution of the substantive aspects of legitimacy 
involved in anti-dumping regulation. These substantive issues cannot be defined 
with sufficient precision to warrant specific rules for regulation. The concept of 
‘fairness’ and the balancing of consumer and producer interests in light of the 
‘harm’ caused by dumping are difficult to conceptualize, hence the frustration 
expressed by numerous economists and legal scholars in the face of the ever-
changing perceptions of ‘fusion of power and legitimate social purpose’ involved 
in anti-dumping regulation, to put it in Ruggie’s terms. 
Therefore, much of the concern surrounding the substantive legitimacy 
issues involved in anti-dumping regulation are better characterized as standards, 
rather than rules, requiring gradual defining in order to achieve the precision 
required for more formal rules for regulation. It is easy to forget that the more 
formal regulative issues involved in anti-dumping (such as how to determine 
what constitutes ‘injury’ or a ‘like product’ for anti-dumping purposes), as 
embodied in the Canadian reform proposals, are concerns that have developed 
over many years of global anti-dumping practice. These concerns have gradually 
appeared in the international forum, changing the international constitutive 
landscape to reflect the constitutive norms and beliefs emerging within domestic 
populace. Even the current provisions of the ADA developed in the Uruguay 
round as a reaction/reform to the prevalent concerns emerging from the previous 
Kennedy round anti-dumping laws. These ‘standards based’ issues require the 
appropriate domestic mechanisms in which to develop into constitutive norms 
capable of developing into an international regulative framework. Thus, in the 
quest for further anti-dumping reform, a space must remain open at the domestic 
level for legitimacy concerns to continuously define, and redefine themselves. 
To return to public interest analysis and critique, embedded liberalism, 
driven through the public interest processes at the domestic level, provides civil 
                                                 
 155 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Public Participation in the Trade Regime: Of Litigation, Frustration, 
Agitation and Legitimation, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 916, 963 (2003-2004). 
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society the space within which to voice its interest, and ultimately, to reshape the 
international regulatory framework. In the context of anti-dumping, by engaging 
the appropriate domestic mechanisms and exercising the right to voice their 
concerns, civil society groups are able to reshape the constitutive rules. The 
changing norms within one state influence other states in two ways; primarily, 
the pressure placed on the state itself will require it to shift its stance towards 
these same issues in the international forum, and second, civil society and public 
interest groups in other states may adopt such methods to change the norms 
within their own home states. 
Thus, a piecemeal reform, similar to the approach taken by Canada over the 
last three decades and within the Doha Round, is the key to opening anti-
dumping up to the possibility of greater reform in the future. Primarily, the 
Canadian position, as evidenced by the numerous proposals submitted to the 
WTO during the current Doha round, seeks to create greater certainty and formal 
legitimacy in the international application of anti-dumping laws, in an attempt to 
create an international climate of non-discriminatory anti-dumping practices. 
Second, Canada’s emphasis, both within its domestic laws and at the WTO, on 
incorporating public interest into anti-dumping, creates the necessary opening for 
substantive change and constitutive reform, thereby accepting the realistic 
tensions between non-discrimination and protectionism, formal and substantive 
justice, and the interaction between these issues and the ever-changing 
constitutive norms which affect our perceptions of legitimacy. 
At the domestic level, the challenge lies in empowering civil society in order 
to exercise the voice of public interest. Finger and Zlate state that in order to 
better incorporate the public interest into anti-dumping law: 
“[r]eform depends also on the entrepreneurship of lobbyists/lawyers to 
organize the users/consumers into an effective political force. There is an 
untapped client base here, we are confident that as the number of trade 
lawyers grows and competition for the presently recognized ‘interested 
parties’ grows more intense, some among the new entrants into the trade 
bar will recognize the business opportunity that adding users as interested 
parties would provide, and will develop this market – as the present 
generation of trade lawyers developed a market among protection users 
and subsequently among foreign exporters. The remedy is more and 
hungrier trade lawyers.”156 
Returning to the Canadian example, in light of the apparent conflicting 
interpretations which the CITT has given to s. 45 of the SIMA and the recent 
developments stemming from Concrete Reinforcing Bar and Gypsum Board 
Reference cases, it appears that more intelligent, creative, and determined 
lawyers must be willing to engage this system in order to create the jurisprudence 
necessary to give body to the constitutive norms which define the Canadian 
‘public interest’. A larger body of jurisprudence provides guidance to future 
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interested parties on how to conduct their legal actions accordingly. Similarly, 
the process of judicial interpretation may lead to government intervention, 
amendments to the current legislation, and possibly a shift in Canada’s position 
at the international level. This same process, reproduced across jurisdictions 
worldwide, would open a new international discussion on the constitutive norms 
at play in international anti-dumping practice. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Viewed in light of the constructivist perspective on international law, and 
more specifically, the embedded liberalism view of the international trade 
regime, the current Canadian approach to international anti-dumping reform 
appears to be the most coherent and realistic approach to this contentious issue in 
international and Canadian domestic law. This piecemeal approach suggests that 
the WTO ADA be reformed to provide greater formal legitimacy and certainty 
by clarifying the procedures and analyses conducted within anti-dumping 
practice, such as the application of ‘injury’, ‘like products’, and ‘public interest’ 
inquiries. This increased formal legitimacy will assist in promoting less 
discrimination in international anti-dumping practice, bolstering a perception of 
greater overall legitimacy. 
More importantly, Canadian public interest experience demonstrates the 
space created by domestic public interest processes is an essential opening for 
development of international norms and further reform of anti-dumping law 
generally. The public interest space allows domestic society to express its views 
on the ever-changing perceptions of social purpose, fairness, and legitimacy, 
thereby (re)shaping the constitutive norms that form the fabric of social 
consciousness and applying pressure for changes at the international level. With 
decades of debate regarding the appropriateness of anti-dumping law behind us, 
perhaps the inclusion of public interest inquiries around the world will create a 
new forum for a new discussion, and a better understanding of the complex 
socioeconomic factors at play in global anti-dumping practice. 
Given the dual aspect of this analysis focusing on the international/domestic 
dichotomy, neither international anti-dumping law (specifically, the WTO ADA) 
nor domestic jurisdictions outside of Canada were examined extensively. Future 
research could examine each area in far greater detail. At the international level, 
an analysis of the Canadian proposals for WTO ADA reform could be 
undertaken to assess what impact prior WTO practice, both in the domestic 
application of the ADA in various Member states and prior WTO DSB decisions, 
would have on the future application of these reforms. At the Canadian domestic 
level, a far more in-depth analysis of the possibilities of judicial review under s. 
45 of the SIMA is definitely warranted, especially in light of the effects of 
current jurisprudence and recent developments. Another interesting topic may be 
an examination of what role, if any, the law of class actions can play in 
protecting consumer interests in the context of anti-dumping law. Unfortunately, 
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given the constraints of this article, these interesting topics fall outside the scope 
of this analysis, but hopefully provide direction for future scholarship. 
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